Nord-Pas-de-Calais - CAMBRAI Battlefields

The Monument de Briquet et Taillandier commemorates two elected representatives of the National Assembly of France for Pas-de-Calais.  On 25 March 1917 they were trapped in the town hall and they were killed by a large explosion.

In the intermezzo below I tell more about the backgrounds of these booby-trap explosions. 

Operation Alberich - The German Withdrawal on the Hindenburg Line

From 4 February 1917 General Erich Ludendorff ordered the Germans to organise secretly a 4 weeks during operation, called Operation Alberich.

Alberich was an intentional, strategic withdrawal on the Hindenburg Line or Siegfried Stellung, which shortened the German front line with about 40 km.

It was 18 days later, on 22 February 1917, that for the first time a patrol of Royal West Kents reported unmanned trenches in front of Miraumont, Somme, 3 days later followed by observations on the spot by daring Australian soldiers near the Butte de Warlencourt, Somme. Operation Alberich meant also that the Germans left their grounds being a completely destroyed wasteland. Before the Germans left the terrain, they destroyed everything of value, as the "Grosser Bilderatlas des Weltkrieges" still proudly mentions in detail in it's edition of 1919:

We leave Bapaume and we continue for some 5 km. along the Bapaume-Cambrai road, the D 930, to Beugny.

We visit the Red Cross Corner Cemetery of Beugny.

The cemetery lies along an important supply road of the First Battle of Cambrai to the Hindenburg Line.

During the winter of 1916–17 the Germans secretly constructed a vast system of defences between Arras and St. Quentin, a “new” frontline, which reduced the length of the front by some 40 km.: the Hindenburg Line or Siegfried Stellung.

These 3 or sometimes 4 lines of fortifications, partly constructed by Russian P.O.W.’s, consisted of vast belts of barbed wire, ...

... concealed observation posts, rows of deep trenches, ...

... dug-outs, machine-gun bunkers, concrete shelters, ...

... tunnels for moving troops and underground communication, and command posts.

Along the line the ruins of the former villages were altered into fortified strongholds.

At a distance of 1-1,5 km. in front of these fortifications was a thinly-held outpost line, “das Vorpostenfeld”, mutually supporting small posts with light machine-guns.  Behind this chain of outposts lay the first line of resistance.

Between the first line and the second line the Germans created a battle zone of about 2-3 km. deep, to deploy mobile, fast counter-attacks against invaders of the first line.

The Hindenburg Line enabled the Germans to keep 13 divisions in reserve and to release these divisions for defensive operations, counter-attacks and offensives. The German High Command believed in 1917 that it's new, formidable line was impregnable.

For our explorations in front of Cambrai we concentrate on a rather small sector of the Hindenburg Line; the Siegfried Stellung, the Monchy Riegel, and Siegfried II, the former "deutschen Stellungen im Cambraibogen".

View from the cemetery eastward to Doignies.

Panorama view north-eastward. Left the Bapaume-Cambrai Road. Left, behind the water tower, the Louverval Memorial, on the horizon Bourlon Wood. Right the village of Doignies.

The First Battle of Cambrai (20 November - 6 December 1917)

The Opponents

The German 2nd Army under command of General der Kavallerie, Georg von der Marwitz (1856-1929, installed itself with 8 divisions on the Hindenburg Line.

The British Third Army, under command of General Julian Byng, deployed for the offensive on the right 6 infantry divisions of III Corps (under Lt. Gen. Pulteney), and on the left IV Corps (under Lt. Gen. Woollcombe), supported by 9 battalions of the rather new Tank Corps with 437 tanks (under Lt. Gen. Hugh Elles). Byng kept in reserve 1 infantry division in IV Corps and 3 divisions of the Cavalry Corps (under Lt. Gen. Kavanagh).

Preparations

During the preparations for the battle, the artillery used relatively new tactics like sound ranging and “silent registration” of guns in order to achieve instant suppression of fire and surprise. Artillery fire would support the tanks during the attack with high explosive ammunition without cratering too much the ground. There would be no introducing artillery bombardment at the start of the offensive. The attack would start with a creeping artillery barrage, followed by a combined tank-infantry attack, to secure a breakthrough of the Hindenburg Line.

Lt. Col. John F. C. Fuller, a staff officer with the Royal Tank Corps, and Lt. Gen. Hugh Elles, were looking for a suitable location to use on a large scale the new Mark IV tanks for raiding parties. They were developing new tactics for tanks to support the infantry. Tanks would be deployed to clear the extensive barbed wire defences and to cross the trenches. General Byng decided to integrate the tanks in the infantry attack.

Though many historians emphasize that the First Battle of Cambrai was the first major tank battle in history, I may perhaps modestly remind you that the bulk of the job still had to be done by infantry soldiers.

20 November 1917 - The Start of the Battle

At first the attack looked rather successful; the Hindenburg Line had been penetrated with advances of up to 8 km. deep. In the south the 12th Eastern Division advanced as far as Lateau Wood near Bonavis before being ordered to dig in. The 20th Light Division forced it’s way through La Vacquerie and then advanced to capture the bridge across the St. Quentin Canal at Masnières. The bridge collapsed under the weight of crossing tanks, halting the advance there. In the centre the 6th Division captured Ribécourt and Marcoing but when the cavalry passed through late, they were forced to fall back from Noyelles.

On IV Corps' front, the 51st (Highland) Division stalled at Flesquières, its first objective and this left the attacking divisions on each flank exposed to enfilade fire, where they lost that day 28 tanks on one German action.

To the west of Flesquières, the 62nd West Riding Division swept all the way through Havrincourt and Graincourt to within the reach of the woods on Bourlon Ridge (127 m.).

On the British left flank, the 36th Ulster Division reached the Bapaume-Cambrai road.

The British lost the first day around 4.000 casualties and took 4.200 prisoners. 180 Tanks were out of action, although only 65 had been destroyed. Of the other casualties 71 tanks had suffered mechanical failure and 43 had ditched. But the British had failed to reach their main target, Bourlon Wood.

Von der Marwitz reorganised his Army and he divided the salient in front of Cambrai in 3 sectors; Arras (north), Caudry (centre) and Busigny (south). In the north, the Armeegruppe Arras, consisting of 4 divisions, under command of Generalleutnant Otto von Moser (1860-1931) concentrated the attack at the sector of Bourlon Wood. In the centre and south the two Armeegruppe, Caudry and Busigny, each consisting of two divisions, attacked the central sector in front of Cambrai, Flesquières and Havrincourt.

Ten days later during the battle these 3 German army groups together would expand by these auxiliaries to the size of 20 divisions.

The next day the Germans recaptured Flesquières. The fighting around Bourlon and at Anneux was still fierce.

German counter-attacks squeezed the British out of Moeuvres on the 21st and on the 22nd out of Fontaine. Even after taking nearby Anneux the 62nd Division was not able to enter Bourlon Wood. The British were left exposed in a salient.

On the 23rd the exhausted 62nd Division was replaced by the 40th Division.

In the morning the 40th Division attacked the height of Bourlon Wood, supported by almost 100 tanks and 430 guns, but the division made little progress. The Germans had put two divisions of Armeegruppe Arras on the height with another two in reserve. The British 40th Division reached the crest but were held there and it would suffer over 4.000 casualties in 3 days.

On the 27th the British made a final effort to conquer Bourlon Wood, supported by 30 tanks, without result. The British now held a salient, roughly 11 km. by 9.5 km., with its front along the crest of the Bourlon height. On the 28th the offensive was stopped and the British troops were ordered to dig in. The Germans were quick to concentrate their artillery on the new British positions. On the 28th over 16.000 rounds were fired into the wood.

But the Germans were still not satisfied with bringing the British to a halt and they kept bringing in more troops.

On 30 November von der Marwitz started a counter-offensive. The Germans intended to retake the Bourlon salient and also to attack Havrincourt to reach at least the old positions of the Hindenburg Line.

At 9.00 hrs. a dozen Divisions of Army Groups Busigny and Caudry attacked the British lines. Armeegruppe Busigny attacked from Banteux to Gouzeaucourt and Epéhy. Armeegruppe Caudry attacked from Bantouzelle to Marcoing. At 12.00 hrs. the Armeegruppe Arras attacked with 7 divisions the Bourlon Wood area.

The unexpected overwhelming power of smoke, artillery fire and the fast advance of the infantrymen, totally surprised the British forces.
In the south the Germans advanced up to 13 km. and they came within a few kilometres of the vital village of Metz-en-Couture. In the north, at Bourlon, the British had assigned 8 divisions and the Germans still suffered heavy casualties. 

On 2 December the momentum of the German advance was lost, but it’s pressure still led to the recapture of La Vacquerie and to the British withdrawal to the west bank of the St. Quentin Canal.

On 3 December, Haig ordered a retreat from the salient and by 7 December the British gains were abandoned except for a portion of the Hindenburg line around Havrincourt, Ribécourt and Flesquières.

The British counted 44.207 casualties and 9.000 soldiers taken Prisoner of War.
The Germans counted 34.000 casualties and 11.000 German soldiers taken Prisoner of War.

The Allies did indeed win quite some territory since the days of the Battle of the Somme of summer 1916 and during the following battles to follow until Cambrai, December 1917.

On 21 March 1918 however the German Oberste Heeres Leitung deployed the massive "Michael-Schlacht", or Michael Offensive, re-conquering all lost terrain of Cambrai, Artois, and Somme until Arras and Albert. The offensive stopped at 5 April 1918. All gained grounds of the Allies would be lost until at least August 1918.

On the map below our route is roughly projected on the situation sketch of November-December 1917. We return to the year of 2011 to the Bapaume-Cambrai Road at Louverval.

After this intermezzo we continue from Beaumetz-les-Cambrai along the D 930 to Louverval.

First we visit the Cambrai Memorial of Louverval.

On 2 April 1917 the 56th Australian Infantry Battalion occupied the Château at Louverval. The hamlet of Louverval stayed in Allied hands until 21 March 1918, the start of the German Michael Offensive. Louverval was recaptured in September 1918.

We descend the stairs at the left of the Memorial to visit the Louverval Military Cemetery.

Four soldiers, fallen 20 November 1917, of the 1st Battalion London Regiment Royal Fusiliers.

At the centre of the village, on the northern side of the road, stands a remarkable Poilu-statue.

From Boursies, we deviate from the Bapaume-Cambrai road, and we continue southward to Hermies, and from there eastward, to the Canal du Nord.

Not only in the winter of 1917, but also later, in the autumn of 1918, the deep Canal du Nord formed a formidable obstacle for the advancing troops.

The 1918 Battles near Cambrai (25-09 until 10-10-1918)

The Battle of the Canal du Nord (27 September – 1 October 1918)

One day after the start of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, on 27 September 1918, Canadian and New-Zealand forces started the Battle of the Canal du Nord.

The construction of the 95 km. long Canal du Nord began in 1913 and was intended to link the Oise River to the Dunkerque-Escaut Canal. With the outbreak of the Great War the construction was halted and the construction works were left in varying stages of completion. The Canal with it's steep slopes is approximately 30 m. deep and 60 m. wide.

The Canal du Nord defensive system was the last major prepared defensive position of General von Below’s 17th Army and General von der Marwitz’s 2nd Army. The Canal formed nevertheless a significant obstacle as the Germans had taken measures to incorporate the unfinished canal into their defensive system. Beyond the damage done to make crossing the canal as difficult as possible, the Canal du Nord Defense Line ran directly behind the east bank of the canal. Along the banks the Germans swamped or flooded large areas, which made crossing the Canal more difficult.

During the night of 2 September the Oberste Heeres Leitung ordered the 17th Army to retreat behind the Canal du Nord and the following night it ordered the 2nd Army to withdraw to the Hindenburg Line. Especially the Prussian 1. Garde Reserve Division and the 3. Marine-Division would defend the lines.

General Henry Horne’s 1st Army and General Julian Byng’s 3rd Army were to co-operate; the 1st Army had to secure the northern flank of the 3rd Army, and it had to take care of diversions. The 3rd Army had to secure the Escaut (Scheldt) Canal. Of the 1st Army the Canadian Corps under command of General Sir Arthur Currie would lead the attack, crossing the Canal, mainly some 8 km. to the north, on a front of only 2.500 m. between Sains-lès-Marquion and Mœuvres. Once over the Canal the Canadian Corps had to capture the Marquion Line, the villages of Marquion and Bourlon Wood.

During the 4 weeks before the battle, Currie and Byng prepared thoroughly for the attack. Two divisions were sent south to cross the canal at a weaker point, while Canadian and New Zealand Engineers worked to construct often wooden bridges for the assault. To distract the Germans from the main attack XXII Corps, VII Corps, and the remainder of XXII Corps were instructed to carry out minor attacks for diversion on other positions along the Canal du Nord and along the Scarpe river.

On 27 September at 5.20 hrs. all four divisions attacked taking the German defenders of the Prussian 1. Garde Reserve Division and the 3. Marine-Division by surprise.

By noon all defenders had retreated or had been captured.

The combats would continue until 10 October 1918, finishing with the capture of Cambrai.

Back to 27 September 1918. The capture of the Canal du Nord gave way to the final campaign to Cambrai.

It took the New Zealand Tunneling Company 8 days to complete the bridge and to cross the Canal.

We cross the Canal and continue eastward to Havrincourt.

At Havrincourt we pass the gate of the impressive Château de Havrincourt.

Behind the Canal du Nord, the fortified village of Havrincourt formed the first line of the German defence. The Germans used the Château de Havrincourt as an important command post. In 1916 even Kaiser Wilhelm II paid the castle a visit.
In February 1917 the Germans dynamited the castle to prevent it becoming a shelter for the Allies. The ruins still served as a stronghold.

The restored Château de Havrincourt.

We drive eastward around the northern part of the park to the Memorial of the 62nd West Riding Division.

During the Battle of Havrincourt (12 September 1918) the 62nd West Riding Division recaptured,together with the New Zealand Division and the 2nd Division, the village. This battle lasted only one day, because in this late-war period the German soldiers were demoralised and lacked all fighting spirit.

View from the memorial south-eastward.

We drive back around the castle and we continue southward to Trescault.

From there we follow the D 17, the "Ribécourt Road", north-eastward.

On the northern side of the "Ribécourt Road" stands the 42nd East Lancashire Territorial Division Memorial. See the Division's map above for details of the 1918 operation.

From the Memorial a panorama view south-eastward.

We continue for 1 km. along the Trescault - Ribécourt Road. We park our car to enjoy a panorama view at the smaller, north-west part of Havrincourt Wood.

Zoomed-in: Our view point is marked with a green dot.

The five clockwise overlapping panorama views are directed at the south-west edge of the north-west part of Havrincourt Wood and Havrincourt village. The other panorama view focuses north-eastward to the village of Ribécourt-la-Tour.

Havrincourt Wood, and right Havrincourt village.

Ribécourt-la-Tour was taken on 20 November 1917 by the 6th Division and the 51st Highland Division. At the end of the battle it remained practically on the British front line. It was lost in March 1918 and recaptured by the 3rd and 42nd East Lancashire Divisions on 28 September 1918. 

Ribécourt-la-Tour, left on the horizon Flesquières.

From Ribécourt-la-Tour we continue northward along the D 89 to Flesquières.

I emphasize here the Blue Gate, because it is an important landmark for locating the Tank Memorial, which is from the road hardly visible and easily missed.

Along the sandy road into the wood, opposite the Blue Gate stands the Tank Memorial or the ...

In 1917 Flesquières was one of the strongest points in the German lines, flanked by other strong points. The British tanks of the 51st Highland Division would face the German 54th Division. The 54. Division was one of the few divisions, which had specialised in training in anti-tank tactics and which had already some combat experience against French Renault tanks during the Nivelle Offensive of April-May 1917.

On 20 November 1917 the 51st Highland Division were forced to halt at Flesquières, it’s first objective. This left the situation for the other attacking divisions on each flank exposed to enfilading fire. Batteries of Feld Artillerie Regiment 108 destroyed at least 28 tanks.

The commander of the 51st Division, Lt. General George Harper, made a tactical mistake; he had "substituted his own tank drill" for the standard one, laid down by the Tank Corps; his tank drill caused an excessive distance between the tanks and the infantry, which contributed to the failure.

The memorial has the shape of a tank track.

From left to right. Into the direction of Ribécourt (right).

"La Tour", the typical Tower of Ribécourt-la-Tour.

This the landscape in which 28 tanks were knocked out.

Havrincourt Wood on the horizon.

Behind these 3 trees below right Unteroffizier Theodor Krüger would have knocked out 5 tanks, before he was killed.

From here we enter the village of Flesquières for some 750 m. to visit, on appointment, the barn of the "Espace Louis Carnian".

Before we just walk on to the tank, ...

... we start our short tour with some views of ...

... an interesting 1918 U.S. Army truck.

The Crown of the collection is of course the wreck of the D. 51 Deborah Tank.

The "open wound" of the Deborah Tank.

From Flesquières we continue northward via Anneux to Bourlon Wood.

Bourlon Wood, photographed from Anneux northward.

From the village of Bourlon we ascend to Bourlon Wood.

The Canadian Bourlon Wood Memorial commemorates the attack across the Canal Du Nord on ground donated by the Comte de Franqueville, at the end of the war being the Mayor of Bourlon.

View from the Memorial Park westward.

From Bourlon Wood we continue southward, first to the western outskirts of Marcoing, next to cross at the centre of the village the St. Quentin Canal to continue to the Marcoing British Cemetery.

In the village of Marcoing we cross the bridge over the next obstacle, the Canal du St. Quentin, on our route to Masnières.

On the southern side of the D 15 and some 200 m. from the bank of the St. Quentin Canal we pause to visit the Marcoing British Cemetery.

In 1917 the Newfoundlanders played an important role during the fights near Masnières.

We follow the St. Quentin Canal to Masnières, cross again the Canal and follow it to the northern outskirts of les-Rues-des Vignes.

There are three other similar Caribou Memorials in France: at Beaumont-Hamel, Gueudecourt, and Monchy-le-Preux.

At the northern outskirts of Les-Rues-des-Vignes, opposite Crèvecoeur-sur-l'Escaut on the other side of the Canal, we see the bridge, which was in 1917 "a bridge too far" .

We also reached here our most eastern location of our trip.

We return westward via Bonavis to La Vacquerie.

On 3 December the Germans recaptured la Vacquerie, during the British withdrawal.

Remark the poppies in the field on the right.

View from the cemetery northward at the church tower of Villers-Plouich.

Here we visit the Sunken Road Cemetery.

From Villers Plouich we go on southward to Gouzeaucourt.

During the night of 12-13 April 1917 the 8th Division occupied Gouzeaucourt. It was lost on 30 November 1917 in the German counterattack at the end of the First Battle of Cambrai, and the same day the 1st Irish Guards recaptured it. On 22 March 1918 Gouzeaucourt was lost again. On 18 September 1918 the 38th Welsh Division attacked the village again. During the Second Battle of Cambrai, on 8 October 1918, the 21st Division finally recaptured Gouzeaucourt.

On this cemetery we find many graves of high officers.

Some soldiers are "BURIED NEAR THIS SPOT", or they are "BELIEVED TO BE BURIED IN THIS CEMETERY".

On this cemetery we find many graves of members of the Royal Tank Corps of both periods, of 1917 and of 1918.

As often happens, the Cross of Sacrifice offers a magnificent view over the landscape.

From the cemetery a panorama view southward.

From Gouzeaucourt we continue north-westward via the D 29b and the D7 to Metz-en-Couture.

Via Neuville-Bourjonval and Ytres we continue to our last site of interest, west of the village of Equancourt.

In Neuville-Bourjonval we pass this painted Poilu statue.

Again; we see here many graves of Royal Tank Corps members.

But the majority of the graves are reserved for infantry soldiers.

Two French civilians share a plot with some German soldiers.

A German aviator and a British aviator, both killed in August 1918, lie next to each other.

A plot of German graves.

We end our virtual tour of the Cambrai battlefields with a last panorama view northward into the direction of ....